Peacekeeping+and+Peacebuilding

=Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding=


 * The ACOTA Program, Henry L. Stimson Center Assessment February 2005[[file:ACOTA_BriefFinal_Feb05.pdf]]**

The U.S.-led coalition’s day-to-day commander in Afghanistan said that “a very low number” of Afghan battalions are able to operate independently in the country--and even those still rely on coalition partners for logistical, medical, and maintenance support. Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, the No. 2 ranking officer in Afghanistan who heads the coalition's Joint Command, told Pentagon reporters on Wednesday that only 29 battalions in the Afghan national army and seven in the Afghan national police meet the “highest rating” to operate independently. The United States still provides advisory groups and “enablers” for their missions. This is “a relatively small number for that large of an army or a police,” Scaparrotti said, estimating this was about 1 percent of the total force. “To be honest with you, it’s a very low number.” Washington has spent more than $27 billion to train and equip Afghan security personnel since 2002.
 * Pentagon: Even ‘independent’ Afghan battalions still rely on NATO - GovExec.com 8 Feb 2012**

http://www.govexec.com/defense/2012/02/pentagon-even-independent-afghan-battalions-still-rely-nato/41134/

Senegal participates in France’s Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), created in 1997 to boost African peacekeeping forces.[i] French training heavily influenced Senegal’s military doctrine[ii] and France provides two to three million euros per year[iii] in military training.

[i][] (Reliability: 44.16, High. Accessed 20 January 2012). [ii] “Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Senegal” Accessed through [|www.janes.com] 20 January 2012 “Senegalese doctrine has traditionally been heavily influenced by French military doctrine, with most Senegalese senior officers undergoing training in French academies.” [iii] “Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Senegal” Accessed through [|www.janes.com] 20 January 2012 “The French assistance programme to the Senegalese Armed Forces also includes the training of Senegalese military personnel in France and direct military assistance amounting to a few million euros per year (XOF1.8 billion in 2003).”

In 2000, the Zambezi River experienced significant flooding, and the nation of Mozambique was ill equipped to deal with the humanitarian disaster that followed. Homes were swept away, thousands of people were displaced, and 700 perished, leading to the deployment of a U.S. civilian disaster assistance response team and U.S. military forces to provide medical assistance and security to help Mozambique stabilize the situation.
 * "AFRICOM and the Principle of Active Security" by Ward & Galvin**

The aim of this Manual is to provide guidelines for actual or prospective troop-contributing governments in the preparation and training of their personnel for assignment with United Nations peace-keeping operations (PKO).
 * UN Peacekeeping Training Manual**

The latest Army doctrine, FM 3-07, reflects a long journey by the American military and a series of hard won lessons learned by the post-Cold War generation. It underscores a recognition that the U.S. military will increasingly be called upon to help bring peace and order to societies under stress. The process by which the manual was written highlights the understanding that the military alone cannot succeed in these challenging environments, but must coordinate efforts with civilian partners through a comprehensive approach toward a shared objective. FM 3-07 fills a profound intellectual void by describing the complex 21st century landscape and articulating the military’s unique role in bringing order to chaos. The manual’s publication, at a time when the U.S. military is already stretched thin by commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, has generated heated debate and raised almost as many questions as it answers.
 * FM 3-07 Stability Operations - A Comprehensive Approach to the 21st Century**

Many culturally plural states, such as Iraq, have a very uncertain sense of national identity and community. The ethnic communities that comprise divided societies typically do not see each other as inter-dependent parts of a single national entity. This is especially true in nations whose national boundaries and institutions were a product of external or colonial imposition, like Iraq. To the contrary, in such divided societies members of each ethnic or religious group often perceive members of other communities as ‘outsiders’, or, in the extreme, as dehumanized and threatening hostile adversaries. Thus, the fundamental challenge of democratization and peacebuilding lies not in the absence of democratic values, but rather, in the fact that members of many culturally plural states simply do not see themselves as part of the same national community.
 * Wolpe, H., & McDonald, S. (2008). Democracy and Peace Building. Rethinking the Conventional Wisdom. //The Round Table//, //97//(394), 137-145.**

The **leaders** of the belligerent parties ** must come to see collaboration—even with former foes—not as an abstract ideal or as an act of altruism, but rather as a matter of enlightened self-interest. They must be able to see themselves as emerging stronger and more secure through collaboration with other **s. Democracy and peace are sustainable only when leaders of a divided society have come to recognize that, whatever their conflicting interests, they share more important commonalities. It is only when they come to see themselves as dependent upon one another, as fundamentally part of the same social and political universe, that they will have the will and the capacity to attack the underlying social and political inequalities that gave rise to their conflict in the first instance.

[A] new consensus must be forged among key leaders on ‘the rules of the game’, i.e., on how power will be shared and organized, and how decisions will be made. For such a consensus to have broad legitimacy, it must be developed in a process that is wholly owned by the leaders themselves and that is inclusive of all key elements of the society. Absent the development of such an inclusive consensus, sustainable peace and democracy are unattainable.

These internationally facilitated efforts have been directed NOT—as in Iraq—at imposing constitutional or political ‘fixes’ conceived by external interests, but rather, at providing the key leaders of these divided societies the tools with which they can themselves collaboratively build their own future.

[G]et the right people into the room, i.e., key leaders within all social and institutional sectors who, by virtue of their formal roles or their informal influence, can strategically impact on the broader society. Sometimes a single country or an international institution such as the United Nations or the World Bank will have sufficient leverage to secure the participation of key leaders. In other situations there may be a particularly credible neutral person or institution within the society that can serve to kick-start the process. On occasion, however, it may be nigh impossible to find a neutral third party, either within the country or within the international community, with sufficient credibility and gravitas...It is vital, however, that the process used to identify and recruit the key leaders is seen not as a process manipulated by external actors, but as a process in which the selection of key leaders is an accurate reflection of the views of the parties involved in the conflict.

The US via its Global Peace Operations Initiative Program (GPOI) has trained more than 69,000 military personnel from 73 countries since 2005, over 48,000 of whom have deployed to 20 operations around the world. In Africa, G8 countries have provided fundamental support to peacekeeping preparedness, with the UK, for instance, having trained 12,000 peacekeepers since 2004-05 via support for centers in 13 countries, and France having prepared 3000 trainees, mostly at African training centers, and 6800 troops from 27 countries, including 9 peacekeeping battalions in 2008 alone.
 * G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding. (2009).**

"The G8 peacekeeping/peacebuilding experts commend the African Union and sub-regional organizations for their efforts to build capacity and for advances in standing up regional missions, according to the principle of local ownership. We recommend expanded partnerships with the AU and with sub-regional organizations to reinforce local capacities in all sectors..."

**Peace support operations are often hindered by a lack of transportation and logistical support on the part of regional or UN troop contributors.**

http://www.commit4africa.org/commitments/-/AU/Infrastructure/ - page focused on AU statements/efforts in Infrastructure
 * G8 St. Petersburg Declaration on Cooperation and Future Action in Stabilization and Reconstruction:**

**UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)**, established in 2005 as an important coordination body to assist countries in their transition from conflict to peace. As a result of PBC engagement, each of the Commission’s current focus countries has established a strategic framework to prioritize key peacebuilding challenges and track progress. G8 countries have been active in creating the Commission’s tools and processes, and in providing substantial financing to the Peacebuilding Fund.

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) African Union Panel of the Wise African Standby Force
 * Africa-based Initiatives **

Japanese Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding launched in 2007 - WHAT IS IT? WHAT DOES IT DO IN AFRICA?

Amisom takes on regional, continental character, as Kenya heightens attacks

How joining Amisom will boost Kenya’s campaign in Somalia "Amisom contingents, on the other hand, benefit from the UN’s logistical support package, which caters for everything from flak jackets and helmets to food, medical evacuations, accommodation and beddings. Further, an AU/EU strategic partnership agreement through the African Peace Facility has to date provided over $275 million to cover soldiers’ allowances and civilian operational costs. As a result, Amisom troops are paid at rates equivalent to other UN peacekeeping operations ($1,028 a month). Further, via voluntary contributions to the Amisom Trust Fund, the UN actually pays for and maintains the equipment, such as tanks and guns, that Amisom contingents deploy to Somalia."